Established tests for asymmetric information in insurance markets are examined. The most commonly used, that information is symmetric if high and low cover contracts have the same loss rate, is inconsistent with standard assumptions that imply that under symmetric information, all contracts o¤er full-cover. Incomplete cover and symmetric information can be reconciled if there are claim-processing costs, but now existing tests fare badly, partly due to the divergence between marginal and average selection e¤ects. Ignoring the nature of loading factors may cause recent studies to mismeasure the welfare costs of asymmetric information but these problems are remedial.
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As the quote indicates, the policy concern is not so much determining whether selection e¤ects are present, but knowing whether they lead to substantial ine¢ ciency. This does not diminish the importance of establishing whether premiums incorporate selection e¤ects. As Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010) note, ". . . .detecting the existence of selection is a necessary precursor to analysis of its welfare e¤ects." (p895).
Our concern is whether the evidence for asymmetric information has been correctly interpreted. The most in ‡uential methodology is that of Chiappori and Salanie (2000) , henceforth CS; which has inspired an upsurge in empirical work on contracts more generally. The procedure is to examine whether, amongst observationally identical individuals, losses are increasing in insurance cover. The rationale of this Positive-Correlation-Property (P CP ) test is that if information is asymmetric, greater cover induces more reckless behavior and attracts those with private knowledge that they are more than averagely prone to loss. If "large" di¤erences in loss rates between contracts can be rejected, it is concluded that information is close to symmetric. 1 For young French drivers, CS …nd that buyers of comprehensive insurance do not experience signi…cantly higher accident rates than those with only third-party cover. According to the P CP -test, information symmetry cannot be rejected.
An augmented test is developed by Chiappori, Julien, Salanie and Salanie (2006) . This CJSS-test takes into account the often considerable administrative cost of insurance. When applied to data on young French motorists, conclusions are reversed from those in the earlier paper. The modi…ed test "corroborates" the presence of asymmetric information in the market for young French drivers.
Given that the two tests deliver con ‡icting conclusions, it is natural to enquire, which, if either, is correct. It is easily seen that under standard assumptions the P CP test involves a contradiction. The reason is that if neither type nor action is hidden, under standard assumptions, all contracts o¤er full cover. 2 If a choice of cover is available, as the P CP -test requires, information is not symmetric. One way to reconcile contractual choice with symmetric information is to introduce administrative costs, often a major part of insurers'costs. Increased cover may then lower expected income even when type is known. The CJSS-test explicitly takes these costs into account, though as a concession to realism rather than to eliminate the contradiction. An inequality is derived which holds under asymmetric information, but as it also holds under symmetric information, the CJSS-test cannot diagnose whether asymmetric information is present.
This leaves open whether the P CP -test works when there are administrative costs. de Meza and Webb (2001) show that claim processing costs may result in a negative correlation (which they term advantageous selection) when type 1 Puelz and Snow (1994) also use the P CP approach, though the statistical implementatiion di¤ers from CS. Some studies incorrectly conclude that inability to reject a zero correlation is evidence of symmetric information. 2 That is, expected utility theory, competition and no administrative cost.
2 is hidden. 3 Hence, asymmetric information can never be rejected statistically. Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2007) show that with …xed administrative costs and exogenously given contracts, the equilibrium may be e¢ cient whether or not the insured have higher or lower loss rates than the uninsured. The Appendix to our paper extends these results to endogenous contracts and claim processing costs, allowing comparison between insurance contracts. It is also shown that a zero correlation between distinct contracts does not imply e¢ ciency and that a negative correlation is consistent with too much insurance. Chade and Schlee (2014) also analyse administrative costs. Their paper mostly concerns monopoly, but similar to our Observation 2A, they note that under competition, a negative correlation is consistent with e¢ ciency. In their case, preferences are homogeneous and administrative costs proportional to the value of claims, whereas we have heterogeneous preferences but claim processing costs. 4 In the body of the paper we assume two risk classes but a continuum of risk preferences and a …xed contract. It is then easily seen that a welfare improving tax (subsidy) is consistent with a positive or zero (negative or zero) correlation, the opposite of the usual presumption.
An alternative to the correlation test is to …nd or create experimentally an exogenous premium change. The e¤ect on the loss rate of the policy is then measured. Though this procedure is harder to implement than the correlation test, we note that it is analytically related. In drawing welfare conclusions, it remains necessary to take administrative costs into account.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains why administrative costs are more than an optional extra when testing for asymmetric information. Then in Sections 3 and 4 we show that both the CJSS and P CP tests for asymmetric information may be passed when information is symmetric and claim-processing costs are present. Section 5 shows that the P CP -test may misidentify the nature of selection e¤ects. In fact, how to de…ne adverse and advantageous selection e¤ects becomes an issue. Section 6 discusses the adequacy of premium change tests and their relation to the correlation test. The implications of our analysis for estimating the welfare cost of asymmetric information are examined in Section 7. Finally, brief conclusions are o¤ered.
The P CP -test is invalid under Rothschild-Stiglitz assumptions
The seminal paper of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , henceforth RS; is invoked by Chiappori and Salanie (2000, p.58) as a foundation for the P CP -test. RS as-sume two types of risk-averse agent di¤ering only in loss probability. There are two or more risk-neutral competitive insurance companies whose only costs are indemnity payments. Assuming type is private information, any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium must be separating. High-loss types are fully insured and lowloss types are incompletely covered. Consistently with the P CP -test, asymmetric information implies a positive correlation between cover and loss propensity.
The issue is what happens under symmetric information. Given actuarially fair o¤ers, risk-averse agents prefer full cover. It is trivial that the Nash equilibrium is that everyone is fully insured. This though implies the P CP -test is inapplicable as there is no variation in cover. The empirical …ndings of CS are inconsistent with the RS model when information is symmetric. Observation 1. Under symmetric information, the RS assumptions imply all contracts provide full cover.
The result is not restricted to the RS model. Nash competition, zero administrative costs, insurer risk neutrality and rationality imply that the loading factor is zero. Risk averse individuals prefer to equalise income across states as long as this can be achieved without sacri…cing expected income. Observation 1 also applies under monopoly as each consumer type would be o¤ered the e¢ cient contract with the seller extracting the full surplus.
Claim-Processing Costs
Observation 1 is trivial but potentially destructive. To preserve the correlation based methodology, the RS assumptions must be tweaked so as to generate multiple cover levels under symmetric information. The potential modi…cations are to drop at least one of the assumptions: rational expectations; perfect competition; costless administration; or insurance company risk-neutrality. Introducing administrative costs is the least fundamental change. 5 If, though, such costs are equal for all contracts, this does not resolve the problem. As competition results in premiums equalling administrative cost plus expected indemnity payments, the expected income of the insured is the same whichever contract is chosen. Customer risk aversion implies that greater cover will be preferred to less. There is still no variation in cover under symmetric information, other than between those not insuring at all and the fully insured. 6 It is though almost inevitable that administrative costs will vary between contracts. Assuming a non-degenerate loss distribution, the lower the deductible the more claims there are and the greater are expected processing costs. Under competition, administrative costs will be fully priced into contracts, so expected income is lower on contracts o¤ering greater cover. Even under full information, contractual choice depends on loss probabilities and risk preferences. So a variety of contractual choices does not of itself imply asymmetric information. 5 Administrative costs play a key role in generating a negative correlation in de Meza and Webb (2001) whilst Chade and Schlee (2014) use them to explain why bad risks may be denied insurance and to show the possibility of pooling under monopoly. 6 Being uninsured may be chosen as this does raise expected income.
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Not only do claim-processing costs potentially explain the existence of contractual variety under symmetric information, they are empirically relevant. We are not aware of a detailed empirical analysis of claim processing costs, but have examined individual insurance returns lodged with the then UK regulator, the F SA. Claims management costs for non-life lines of insurance are reported at between 8 per cent and 12 percent of claims paid across the di¤erent lines of insurance. See also KPMG (2011), which puts the average loss ratio (net claims and claims expenses as a percentage of net earned premiums) for UK general insurance at 63%. So the payout ratio (claims as a percentage of premiums) is very substantially below the 100% implied by RS assumptions. Total expenses (not just claim processing costs) are some 32% of income. 7 Introducing claim-processing costs is the minimal change to the RS assumptions that a test must cope with. The CJSS-test does explicitly allow for such costs (though the motivation for their introduction is not obviously to reconcile a multiplicity of contracts with symmetric information). The …rst issue is whether the CJSS test can detect the presence of information asymmetry.
Administrative Costs and the Failure of the CJSS test
The starting point of the CJSS analysis is a "Revealed Preference Test"that is necessary for rationality. In principle, this can be applied whatever the structure of administrative costs, the extent of competition in the insurance market, or its information structure.
Revealed Preference Test (RPT ): "....., if an agent chooses one contract, C 1 over another with better coverage, C 2 , the decrease in premium must be su¢ cient for the expected income of the agent to increase at unchanged behaviour" (CJSS p.787)
If RP T does not hold, there must be some buyers of the low-cover contract who would be better-o¤ if they switched to the high-cover policy. So either the buyers are not observationally equivalent (so do not have the option to switch) or at least some buyers are optimistic, i.e. understate their own accident probability. 8 CJSS next substitute out for the premiums in the RP T test. Assuming competition and corporate risk neutrality, the premium on a policy equals the expected cost of providing it, which is the expected payout under the policy plus 7 Some estimates of payout ratios are here; http://www.lovemoney.com/news/4378/insurance-policies-that-pay-out-and-ones-thatdont
For example, motoring 84%, property insurance 55%, travel insurance bought stand alone 67%, or bought through travel operators 40%, mobile phone insurance, 47%. 8 There is a further implicit assumption. Insurees do not face any claim processing costs. For some potential applicants, the psychic costs of claiming is substantial. If a low-deductible policy involves more claims then even for a risk averse individual it may not be preferable even if expected monetary income is no lower. 5 the expected cost of administering it. 9 Using the actual loss rates associated with each policy and making an assumption about the nature of administrative costs enables the premiums to be estimated. Replacing in the RP T the actual premiums with the derived premiums yields the CJSS-test inequalitytheir inequality 7 or its unnumbered successor. 10 If the inequality is violated and the assumptions on loading factors are correct, some buyers'would obtain an increase in expected income from switching to a higher cover policy which is inconsistent with risk aversion and rationality. Notice that in deriving the inequality, no assumption has been made concerning whether information is symmetric or asymmetric. Hence, satisfaction of the inequality cannot speak to the information structure. In fact, failure to satisfy inequality 7 does not even imply irrationality, as the constructed premiums may not equal the premiums actually charged to clients.
To emphasise, the test inequalities are correctly derived from the assumptions. Realism of the assumptions is not the issue. The problem is that the inequalities also hold if information is symmetric. Hence, satisfaction of the inequalities cannot test for asymmetric information.
CJSS examine whether their inequality is satis…ed in the data. Assuming a proportional loading factor ( in their paper) set at a reasonable level, they …nd that for young French motorists the inequality holds. According to CJSS:
"Our conclusion is that this test gives evidence for the positive correlation property: the null of zero correlation is rejected. By taking into account both the dispersion of claims and the cost structure of the insurer, we are able to corroborate the presence of asymmetric information."(p.795).
The objection to drawing this conclusion is not that theories can never be proved empirically as opposed to not falsi…ed but that satisfaction of the inequality provides no evidence either way concerning information structure. For the inequality to hold, the average low-cover individual would experience a fall in expected income from switching to a high-cover contract. Finding that expected income would decline is consistent with rationality, as long as the assumption concerning the loading factor is realistic, whether or not asymmetric information is present. Not switching when higher cover raises expected income is irrational even if information is symmetric. Therefore the inequality is uninformative as to the presence of asymmetric information. It is not even a su¢ cient condition for asymmetric information.
Observation 2 The CJSS test cannot detect the presence of asymmetric information. 9 As CJSS point out, the zero-pro…t condition of competition is more restrictive than necessary. Their inequality holds as long as the higher coverage policy is no less pro…table than the low coverage policy. 1 0 In the notation of CJSS, R h (L), h = 1; 2, are payouts as a function of the loss, L; for contract C h ; F h (L) are the distribution of loss functions associated with the contracts. represents a loading factor proportional to claim size, presumably re ‡ecting transaction costs and E h (L) = R LdF h (L) are expected claims from contract C h . CJSS derive and apply their Inequality (7) ,
, to test for asymmetric information. 6 4 Administrative Costs and the Failure of the P CP -Test
The failure of the CJSS test does not directly imply that the P CP -test breaks down in the presence of administrative costs. To examine, as simply as possible, whether this is the case, we follow the theoretical papers of Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010) and Mahoney and Weyl (2014) in taking contracts as …xed.
The Appendix endogenises contracts in a two-type or three-type setting, …nding similar results. 11 When contracts are prescribed by regulation, the assumption of exogenous contracts is often appropriate. It is true, for example, of Medigap insurance, studied by Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008). They …nd the healthy buy more insurance, attributable to selection e¤ects arising from heterogeneous income and cognitive ability. This could be regarded as advantageous selection, but we show that it does not follow that the market is ine¢ ciently large.
In general, standard theoretical models struggle to endogenise contracts so as to encompass two stylised facts; a) most contracts involve some degree of pooling b) there are normally relatively few contracts in the market. The …rst property is famously ruled out in the RS model, but an important recent paper by Azevedo and Gottlieb (2014), AG; makes considerable progress. They assume a continuum of consumers di¤ering with respect to loss probabilities and risk preferences. A Nash equilibrium involving a continuum of pooling contracts is shown to exist in most cases. So the puzzle of why there are so few contracts remains.
As a compromise between tractability, conformity with the characteristics of typical insurance markets, and desirability of explaining all the features, suppose only a single contract is allowed. 12 The cost of processing a claim is c: 13 There are two unobservable risks types who di¤er in their exogenous probability of su¤ering a …xed …nancial loss of Z. 14 For high-risk types, the chance of loss is h > l where the latter is the loss probability of low risks. Moral hazard is initially absent. There is a non-degenerate distribution of an unobservable risk-aversion parameter for each risk-type. 15 Conditional on risk- 1 1 This is a mild extension of the Appendix to Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2007) who assume …xed contracts and no pooling. 1 2 If exclusionary contracts are impossible, there is just one contract in equiklibrium. For example, sellers do not monitor an individual's total holding of annuities (Abel (1986)). Contracts must, therefore, be linear. The mix of buyers …xes the purchase price of a given income stream. Each type buys a di¤erent quantity of annuities and the main features of our model apply. 1 3 Were there no administrative costs all bad risks participate in a pooling equilibrium since doing so must raise their expected income as well as lowering their risk, Hence, if there are any uninsured, they must have a lower accident rate than the insured. 1 4 Moral hazard lowers the loss rate of the uninsured. A zero correlation can therefore result from advantageous selection o¤setting moral hazard. There is nevertheless market failure due to selection e¤ects as those insuring following a premium fall would lower precautions and so have higher losses than the incumbents. 1 5 Multidimensional heterogeneity is not necessary for the results. Similar e¤ects are possible if types only di¤er in risk preference but there is hidden action as well as hidden types, as In type, demand for the insurance contract is therefore smoothly decreasing in premium. For high risks, demand is H(p) and for low risks it is L(p) where the premium is p: For example, under CARA, utility is e rY : A high risk individual charged a premium at which they are just willing to buy a full-cover policy satis…es p = log(1 h+he rZ ) r ; which is increasing in the CARA parameter, r; and in h. Writing the cut o¤ risk preference as r = r(p; h); and CDF i as the group i distribution function of r; the demand curve of the high-risk types is H(p) = f1 CDF H [r(p; h)]gn h where n h is group h size: Similarly, the demand by the low risks is L(p) = f1 CDF L [r(p; l)]gn l : Although r(p; h) < r(p; l); demand by the high risks is not necessarily higher at given p, it all depends on the cdfs of the two groups. The per capita demand curves could cross, indeed they must do so if one cdf is su¢ ciently compressed relative to the other. In general, the positions of the demand curves of the two groups relative to each other depends on the cdfs, on which no plausible restrictions can be imposed. The demand curves can in e¤ect be regarded as the primitives.
There are constant returns to individual …rms in o¤ering contracts, so in a competitive equilibrium, companies expect to breakeven, inclusive of claim processing costs, with the premium satisfying 16 [hH(p e ) + lL(p e )](Z + c)
To determine whether this outcome is e¢ cient, note that at premium p ; aggregate bene…t, the sum of consumer surplus and the …nancial surplus, is
Assuming the policy maker does not observe type and sets the premium to maximise aggregate surplus (ignoring any deadweight costs from raising revenue), the F.O.C. is
where i = i 0 (p)p i > 0 i = H; L: As h > l; to satisfy the equation, the second bracket of (2) must be positive. If p is an optimum, the …nancial surplus is therefore where the second equality follows from (2) . Thus, at an optimum, 7 0 as H 7 L : 17 Relative elasticities determine whether a tax or subsidy is necessary for optimality, but play no role in the P CP test. 18 The analysis is illustrated in Figure (1) which shows demand by the two risktypes, equally numerous in the population, and from which the cost curves of Figure ( 2) are derived. The demand curves are chosen to generate non monotone average cost. To follow the mechanics, note that at all premiums between p 1 and p 4 ; H(p) > L(p); so the insured have a lower loss rate than the uninsured. According to the P CP -test, if the premium settles in this range there is adverse selection. At premiums between p 1 and p 2 the only buyers are bad risks so the marginal cost of expansion resulting from premium cuts is constant and equal to average cost. Below p 2 good risks enter and therefore average cost of provision starts to fall. The ratio of good to bad risks reaches a maximum at p so average cost has a turning point here. Below p 3 all n bad risks are insured and further premium falls only attract good risks. Hence, average cost falls reaching a global minimum when all good risks are insured. The equilibrium premium is p e ; but the global maximum involves market contraction and the higher premium of p o :
It is easily seen that if, say, administrative costs were higher there could be an interior equilibrium, where the loss rate of the insured equals that of the uninsured but a tax is welfare improving. 19 Reversing the labels on the demand curves of Figure 1 , a parallel analysis allows a negative or zero correlation but a premium subsidy is welfare improving. The key to local e¢ ciency is whether a premium cut will change the proportion of low risks in the pool and therefore a¤ect the average cost of supplying policies.
Observation 3 In a pooling equilibrium, local expansion (contraction) of the market is e¢ ciency enhancing if the demand elasticity of the low risks is greater (lesser) than the high risks and does not depend on the loss rate of the insured relative to the uninsured. For global e¢ ciency, not even the relative magnitude of the elasticities determines whether expansion or contraction is appropriate.
That the sign of selection e¤ects depends on the magnitude of the premium change has implications for what is really meant by adverse selection. Consider two recent, contradictory, de…nitions. According to Einav, Finkelstein and Levin (2010, p316), EF L; adverse (advantageous) selection is present if it would be less (more) costly per capita to insure the whole population. That is, the sign of the di¤erence between the loss rates of the insured and the uninsured (the correlation test) de…nes the nature of selection. In the context of a single exogenous contract model, Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010), EF C; state "....the sign of the slope of the marginal cost curve tells us whether the resultant selection is adverse (if marginal cost is increasing in price) or advantageous (if marginal cost is decreasing in price)." (p.879). As just illustrated, it is perfectly possible one de…nition would classify a market as subject to adverse selection and the other as advantageous.
Of course, de…nitions cannot be right or wrong, just more or less useful. The purpose of a de…nition is therefore relevant in judging its value. In many cases, the reason for distinguishing adverse and advantageous selection is to identify the nature of market failure and the appropriate policy response. A de…nition along EF C lines is then the most appropriate, with two quali…cations. Rather than the slope of marginal cost, the slope of average cost is the appropriate measure. This is because the sign of the local externality is given by the sign of the di¤erence between average and marginal cost, which equals the sign of the slope of average cost. If marginal cost is monotone, so is average cost, but the reverse is not the case. Secondly, when average cost is not monotone, EF C
gives the correct answer for local changes but a global optimum may require the opposite change in coverage.
The EF L de…nition does not directly determine the nature of welfare improving interventions, either local or global. It is perhaps best seen as a descriptive measure of overall selection.
These de…nitions have analogues when there are multiple endogenous contracts, as very neatly shown in the competitive model of Azevedo and Gottlieb (2015) . Loosely expressed, their de…nition of selection e¤ects considers buyers taking a particular contract and computes their loss rate (including moral hazard e¤ects) if all switched to an adjacent, higher cover contract. The loss rate of the switchers is then compared to the existing loss rate on that contract. This comparison is similar in spirit to the EF L de…nition. As AG note, this is a local result in that the sign of the comparison may depend on which contract it is measured at. A second measure, implicit in AG; looks at the consequences of decreasing the price of all contracts o¤ering cover in excess (or below) some threshold by the same small increment. 20 There will be one-way substitution from slightly lower cover contracts. The loss rate of the switchers is compared to those already choosing the threshold contract. This measure di¤ers from the …rst because the mix of switchers induced by a price change may not be the same as all those buying the relevant adjacent contract. The measure can be used to determine whether a premium change would raise welfare and is similar to EF C: Again, it is a local measure.
Taking all these issues into account, a possible policy orientated de…nition of selection e¤ects follows. Adverse (advantageous) selection is present if under full information everyone has at least as much cover as in the equilibrium. As noted, the e¤ect of asymmetric information on cover may not have the same sign for everyone, so even this de…nition is incomplete nor does this de…nition always lead to the same classi…cation as the P CP test or the EF L and EF C de…nitions.
Premium-change Tests
A correlation test implicitly estimates the e¤ect of a particular premium change. In the case of Figure 2 , it is the e¤ect on the loss rate were the premium lowered from the equilibrium of p e to p 4 ; at which level everyone is insured. A caveat is 2 0 AG use this measure to determine the optimal premium schedule. 11 that, to the extent moral hazard is present, the loss rate of the uninsured would be higher were they actually insured. This obscures the selection e¤ects on which e¢ ciency depends. It is not the only issue. As shown in the previous section, whatever the nature of selection over the price interval that attracts all buyers, the opposite form of selection may apply locally. The selection designation may therefore be misleading, along with policy based on it. Finally, the correlation test gives no indication how large a premium change is needed to induce all to buy. This prevents the estimation of welfare cost or the determination of the appropriate policy level.
For these reasons, it is useful to examine the e¤ect of exogenous premium changes (preferably many of them) on loss rates. Of course, it is empirically much more demanding to implement a premium change test than to conduct a correlation test. One method is to …nd a natural experiment, such as a tax change, or the introduction of a mandate, as in Hackmann, Kolstad and Kowalski (2015). Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010) …nd a company that o¤ers di¤erent deals to workers in otherwise similar business units for seemingly arbitrary reasons. Finally, price-change tests can also be implemented through a specially designed …eld experiment, as exempli…ed by Karlan and Zinman (2009) for a consumer loan market or for insurance contracts by Gunnsteinsson (2012) and Polimeni and Levine (2012) .
If multiple contacts are available in the market, a premium change in a single intermediate contract will typically lead to substitutions a¤ecting both higher and lower cover contracts, making it di¢ cult to draw conclusions. In principle, a full demand system should be estimated. As noted by Azevedo and Gottlieb (2015) and discussed in the previous section, if the premium change is applied to all contracts above or below some cover threshold, clean selection e¤ects can be identi…ed. This is automatic if the experiment is conducted for the highest cover policy available in the market. 21 A special case is when there is only a single market policy or there is virtually no private insurance at all, as is the case in the experiments of Gunnsteinsson (2012) and Polimeni and Levine (2012) . In summary, the correlation test amounts to an estimate of the selection e¤ects of a possibly large price change but the critique of its reliability applies to price changes whatever their magnitude.
Observation 4 The P CP test is equivalent to a speci…c premium-change test plus any moral-hazard e¤ ects.
Welfare Measurement
Estimates of how premium changes a¤ect demand and loss rates have been used to quantify the welfare consequences of asymmetric information and the bene…ts of counteracting interventions. What has often been neglected is that the nature of Ioading factors potentially has major e¤ects on the welfare measure.
To see the role of claim processing cost, consider the single-contract pooling model of Section 5. The average cost of providing n contracts to the highest willingness to pay types is
where p is the average loss rate, Z is the insured loss, and m = c=Z; the loading factor due to claim processing costs. The corresponding social marginal cost is
where = p 0 n=p is the elasticity of the aggregate loss rate with respect to n, the sign of which identi…es the nature of the local selection e¤ect. The absolute gap between average and marginal cost is p(n) (1 + m)Z. If the surplus created by a marginal change in market size in the bene…cial direction is calculated without taking claim processing cost into account, it will, therefore, be overestimated by proportion m: For …nite changes, the error will be greater as for all intramarginal units, price does not equal average cost. To illustrate, consider, for example, the Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2015), HKK; study of the e¤ect of the introduction of a mandate on the individual health insurance market in Massachusetts. The mandate involves …ning non-buyers, so has the e¤ect of increasing demand for insurance. HKK estimate that claims per policy fall, indicating adverse selection. 22 In Figure 3 , average claim costs per policy are AC with associated marginal cost M C : Adding the loading factor brings average cost to AC. The mandate shifts demand from DD to D 0 D 0 with equilibrium sales increasing from no to n1. HKK assume the marginal social cost of providing extra policies is just the extra claims. The welfare gain from counteracting adverse selection is, therefore, the sum of the two shaded areas in Figure 3 . If, though, the loading factor is due to claim processing cost (or reserve requirements), true marginal cost is higher at M C: Hence, only the upper shaded area should be included in the welfare gain from the mandate. In the HKK case, this lowers the gain from the mandate by about a third.
According to HKK, loading factors are not cost based but are pure pro…t. This interpretation is also problematic. The double shaded area is designated by HKK as the welfare gain due to o¤setting the adverse selection distortion. Accepting their assumption that payment of claims are the only variable cost, makes this designation debatable. Even if average claim cost is constant and equal to marginal cost, so there are no selection e¤ects, there is still an upper shaded area so market expansion, if not too great, yields a gain. The reason is that if loading factors do not re ‡ect variable cost, the loading factor is itself a distortion o¤set by the mandate. The welfare gain area is the result of two distortions and to attribute it only to selection e¤ects does not seem appropriate, most dramatically illustrated when there is no selection e¤ect. 23 Under advantageous selection, average cost is rising, and a competitive market over expands. Now, for e¢ ciency, buying insurance that should be taxed rather than not buying it. The analysis goes into reverse and ignoring claim processing costs, which add to marginal cost, leads to an underestimate of the e¢ ciency gain from market contraction.
Observation 5 In competitive equilibria with given contracts, if the e¤ ect of a premium change on costs is limited to the outlay on claims, under adverse (advantageous) selection, the welfare gain from market expansion (contraction) is over (under) estimated.
Loading factors also drive the results in Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010), EFS . They provide a sophisticated measurement of the welfare costs of selection e¤ects in the UK annuity market. Three annuity contracts di¤ering in the duration of the guaranteed payment were available in the market. The paper …rst applies the correlation test to establish whether asymmetric information is present. Mortality is not monotone in guarantee length, suggesting an ambiguous answer. 24 To estimate the magnitude of the e¢ ciency cost of asymmetric information, EF S adopt a structural approach. Speci…c forms for the utility and hazard function are assumed, allowing mortality and preference parameters to be calibrated from the observed distribution of contractual choices. Were symmetric information to replace asymmetric information, it is assumed that the same three guarantee durations would be o¤ered, with each contract priced according to individual-speci…c mortality risk. The crucial assumption is that symmetric information equalises loading factors. Speci…cally, every annuity is priced such that the expected payout ratio is the weighted average of the three loading factors observed in the initial market equilibrium. Under this assumption, EF S show that introduction of symmetric information results in everyone switching to the longest duration contract. Rerunning the model assuming asymmetric information but equal loading factors also results in everyone choosing the longest contract. Asymmetric information, therefore, imposes a welfare cost only if it is the cause of unequal loading factors. EFS (footnote 16, p.1066) note that this is a key but debatable assumption. Unlike HKK; loading factors are taken to be a consequence of asymmetric information. A possible theoretical justi…cation is that in contrast to a Nash equilibrium, in an anticipatory equilibrium (Wilson (1977) ), cross subsidies are possible in the setting of exclusive insurance contracts (Miyazaki (1977) , Spence (1978) . High cover contracts taken by the high risks are sold below cost. Annuities are not exclusive contracts, however. Unequal loading factors under asymmetric information could alternatively be due to administrative costs, di¤erential corporate risk costs, imperfect competition or actuarial mistakes. 25 In all these cases, loading factors will not be equalised by symmetric information.
If the EFS assumption is valid, it provides an easy test for the presence of asymmetric information; whether loading factors di¤er across contracts. The assumption is, though, hard to believe.
Conclusion
According to the correlation test, hidden types and hidden action are absent if distinct insurance policies chosen by observationally identical types have the same loss rate. This claim involves a contradiction. If information is symmetric, the standard model implies that all contracts o¤er full cover. Claim processing costs and other ingredients of loading factors, often large in practice, allow a variety of contractual forms. These costs are incorporated in the CJSS test, but the inequality proposed as a su¢ cient condition for asymmetric information also applies when information is symmetric.
With claim processing costs, the standard P CP test cannot be relied on. Even with no moral hazard, a zero correlation does not rule out hidden types, nor does the sign of the correlation necessarily sign local selection e¤ects, which may be the relevant e¤ects to judge market failure. These results have a paradoxical element. If two contracts are o¤ered to observably identical types, but the loss rates of buyers are very di¤erent, it seems that selection e¤ects must be present. They are, but the choice of many buyers may be unresponsive to variation in premiums over particular ranges and their loss characteristics may be very di¤erent to those of the responders. The correlation test goes wrong, at least for policy purposes, because it implicitly assumes the ranking of contracts by average and marginal loss rate coincide, and the relationship is invariant to where it is measured. 26 There seems no natural way to rule out divergences, nor to conclude that they must be small. Multiple exogenous premium changes, if available, can help and may be used to evaluate the welfare cost of hidden types and the bene…ts of remedial action. These estimates depend heavily on the nature of loading factors, whether cost based, due to imperfect competition or asymmetric information itself. This does not seem to have been fully appreciated. Administrative costs are not normally negligible or innocuous in understanding insurance markets.
APPENDIX

ENDOGENOUS CONTRACTS
The results of Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2007) call the correlation test into question, showing that a non-zero correlation between cover and loss is consistent with e¢ ciency when there are …xed administrative costs. They assume insurance contracts are exogenously given, remarking "Endogenizing the equilibrium contract set is di¢ cult when unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences and risk types is allowed..." (p.5) but consider it likely that the results will hold even if contract form is endogenised. We now show that the main results do carry over, but there are some restrictions on what can be observed and some additional possibilities are noted. In particular, we show that a negative correlation, normally associated with advantageous selection, is consistent with less insurance than under full information, and a zero correlation between distinct policies does not imply the equilibrium is e¢ cient. 27 In our analysis, claim processing costs rather than …xed administrative costs are assumed. Whereas …xed costs independent of contract can explain diverse full-information choices between insurance and no insurance, to do the same between contracts requires claim processing costs or some other reason why administrative costs di¤er between contracts. For simplicity, in what follows only a single loss is possible. As a result, full information outcomes can only involve di¤erences between the uninsured and the insured. If two or more loss levels are possible, all results apply to comparisons of more and less (but still positive) insurance.
The assumptions we work with are as follows: a) All individuals have the same income endowment, Y; but may su¤er …nancial loss Z:
b) The probability a high (low) risk type has an accident is h (j). c) There are at least two risk-neutral insurance companies making simultaneous o¤ers of insurance contracts. A contract is de…ned by deductible d and the premium charged to risk type j; p j : d) Processing an insurance claim costs the company c irrespective of the size of the claim. e) In addition to being high or low risk, individuals may have high risk aversion denoted by R; or low risk aversion by r. Let V ij denote the expected utility of risk type j with increasing, strictly concave utility function of risk aversion type i; U i , so
The insurer's break-even premium for an individual of known risk is given by
The …rst task is to determine how claim processing costs in ‡uence full information choices.
Observation 1A If two insurance buyers have the same preferences but di¤ er in their full information choices, the low loss type is fully covered and the high loss type is uninsured. 28 Proof If insurance is to be bought, full cover is the best buy as increments in cover are available on actuarially fair terms. So insurance is bought under
where is loss probability treated for analytical reasons as a continuous variable. When = 0; there is no advantage in insuring and if = 1 the claim processing cost implies it is best not to insure. The slope of the LHS of (3A) in expected utility-loss probability space is (Z + c)U 0 (Y (Z + c)) and so is decreasing in . The slope of the RHS of (3A) is constant. The two sides of (3A) are plotted in Figure 1A . Observation 1A is immediate.
The reason for introducing claim processing costs is to allow for di¤erent choices under full information. Observation 1A implies that if this occurs and preferences are the same for both high and low risks, there cannot be an asymmetric information equilibrium. Such an equilibrium, as in RS; involves separation with full cover by the high risks, but this contradicts the full information preference for no insurance. In what follows, preferences therefore di¤er between risk types.
The remainder of the Appendix is concerned with equilibria in which the P CP test fails. If the full information and hidden types equilibria coincide, then the latter is e¢ cient, so there are no selection e¤ects. In line with the discussion in the text, if there is unambiguously less (more) insurance than in the …rst-best full information case then there is adverse (advantageous) selection.
Observation 2A A negative correlation between cover and loss probability is consistent with e¢ ciency. Figure 2A shows the o¤er curves of the two risk classes under full information. As ex ante moral hazard is absent, o¤er curves are linear, and lower for the better risks. As the deductible approaches the loss, insurance tends to zero, but claim processing costs are still involved. Lower indi¤erence curves are preferred to higher. The outcome if insurance is not taken is contract Z. In the con…guration shown, high risks are insured under full information but the more risk tolerant low risks are not. If information is asymmetric, the equilibrium is unchanged. Full cover is now even less attractive to good risks if o¤ered on the terms appropriate to bad risks. Similarly, the attraction of partial cover is not enhanced for the good risks relative to the full information case.
Observation 3A A negative correlation between cover and loss probability is consistent with less insurance than under full information.
Following Smart (2000) , Wambach (2000) and de Meza and Webb (2001), Figure 3A shows a partial-pooling equilibrium. Here, good risks are more risk averse than bad risks, who, for simplicity, are assumed to be risk neutral (so o¤er curves and indi¤erence curves coincide). Under full information, bad risks are uninsured. Good risks are risk averse and choose full cover under full information. When types are hidden, the equilibrium policy is at E with all the good risks buying. Bad risks are equally well-o¤ buying the policy or going uninsured, with the number buying just enough to yield zero expected pro…t on the contract. Any deviation that leaves the good risks at least as well o¤ brings all the bad risks into the market, rendering the deviation unpro…table.
It is not obvious whether this equilibrium should be characterised as adverse or advantageous selection or neither. The average loss probability of the insured is lower than the uninsured. Some bad risks are insured when for a …rst best outcome they should not be, whilst all good risks buy less insurance than under full information.
Bad risks are all high risk aversion and choose full cover under full information. When risk type is private information, there is an equilibrium in which bad risks are fully covered, the more risk averse of the good risks are partially covered at E and the risk neutral good risks are uninsured. The key property is the relative slope of the indi¤erence curves through E. The bad risks must have a bigger premium cut to compensate for a given increase in deductible than the good risks. At E, deviation to lower cover (increased d) on terms that retain good risks,continues to separate but is unpro…table. Increasing cover fails to separate if the terms are set to retain good risks and is therefore also unpro…table. The hidden types equilibrium has the property that there is zero correlation between the loss rates of those with partial and no cover, though the fully insured have higher loss rate. Asymmetric information has resulted in underinsurance by high risk aversion, low risk types, but a comparison between the uninsured and the partially insured …nds no di¤erence in loss rates.
